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Blast resistant modules (BRMs) have become prevalent at petroleum refining and chemical 
processing facilities over the last decade.  A primary rationale for utilizing a BRM is to allow a 
building housing essential personnel (e.g., operators) to be sited near the process units for which 
they are responsible.  BRMs are selected based on a pressure-rating and response level (typically 
Low, Medium, or High).  A common misconception is that a BRM will be undamaged and reusable 
for a specified blast overpressure rating, and such buildings are often incorrectly referred to as 
“blast-proof”.  In order to absorb blast energy, the walls and roof of a BRM are designed to undergo 
transient accelerations and displacements.  The allowable displacements are dictated by the 
selected response level, and that stated response level does not directly communicate the hazard 
associated with wall deflection and non-structural debris. 
 
Displacement and acceleration of a BRM wall can lead to significant non-structural internal debris 
hazards, as has been observed in testing programs and incident investigations.  These hazards 
become more severe as the BRM blast rating and response level increases.  Such hazards are 
sometimes overlooked when siting a BRM.  A structural analysis of a BRM may be required to 
predict wall accelerations in order to quantify these hazards and properly site the BRM, rather than 
relying solely on a blast overpressure rating.  This paper provides insight into the hazards 
associated with interior finish-out and wall-mounted items commonly observed in BRMs, and the 
means necessary to mitigate these hazards. 
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1 Introduction  
 
Occupied buildings in refining and processing facilities are required to be assessed for potential 
explosion, fire, and toxic hazards as documented in the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) standard 29 CFR Part 1910.  These assessments are performed as part of 
a facility siting study (FSS).  FSSs often show that buildings not deliberately designed to withstand 
blast loads, and buildings located close to process units, have insufficient blast resistance to 
withstand the postulated worst-case blast loads.  As a result, owners must then decide whether to 
strengthen the existing building in place or construct a new building that is designed for the 
required level of blast-resistance.   
 
Safety requirements and inherent hazards at refining and processing facilities make on site 
construction more expensive than traditional commercial construction.  Building upgrades can be 
intrusive to occupants and business interruption is therefore another owner consideration when 
deciding between building upgrades or complete building replacement.  Modular buildings are 
viewed as an attractive option to owners to reduce the on-site construction time and disruptions to 
daily operations.  These buildings are branded in the industry as blast resistant modules (BRMs).  
 
BRMs are constructed similar to shipping containers, albeit with thicker corrugated wall panels 
and a heavier steel frame (beams and columns).  While the construction is stronger than a shipping 
container, the structural members are still expected to sustain damage in a design-basis blast to 
absorb blast energy.  This point is sometimes misunderstood, with owners and operators believing 
they are risk-free in a BRM, expecting little to no damage after a design-basis blast event.  
Depending on the allowable structural response, some BRMs may not be immediately habitable 
following a design-basis blast event.   
 
While a properly-designed BRM will protect building occupants from structural failures during a 
blast, there are other secondary hazards that are often overlooked.  Non-structural items that are 
necessary for the daily operating function of a BRM such as cabinets, shelves, desks, electrical 
equipment, ducting, lighting, etc. can become sources of hazardous debris to building occupants, 
even at blast loads below the BRM blast rating.  This paper discusses current industry practice for 
addressing non-structural debris, the mechanisms that cause hazardous internal debris, and 
mitigation effectiveness in BRMs.   
 
2 Examples of Non-structural Debris  
 
Typical interior non-structural overhead debris consists of drop ceiling components, lights, 
mechanical ductwork and vents, as illustrated in Figure 1a.  Drop ceiling lay-in panels generally 
create the largest volume of interior overhead debris, as observed in Figure 1b, because they “lay” 
between steel framing and are not physically anchored to supports.  They are therefore prone to 
becoming dislodged with minor ceiling movement.  Drop ceiling tiles weigh between 1 to 2 psf, 
equating to a weight of between 8 to 16 lbs for a standard 2 ft × 4 ft lay-in panel.  




(a) Typical overhead items (b) Post-blast event overhead debris 
Figure 1.  Overhead Non-Structural Debris  
 
Figure 1b also shows non-structural debris from overhead lights (troffers) and vents.  These items 
can cause higher vulnerability to occupants upon impact than ceiling tiles due to their increased 
weight (10 to 20 lb troffers and 5 to 10 lb vents).  Troffers and vents can either be built into a drop 
ceiling or stand-alone, typically connected to the structural roof members with vertical gauge wire.  
Failures of these elements include tension failure in the wire itself or unraveling of a poor tie 
connection of the wire.  Mechanical ductwork tends to have the heavier connections consisting of 
steel straps or hangers, and failures in this components are less common, but have been observed 
in accidents.   
 
Figure 2 shows common wall-mounted or near-wall architectural and electrical items such as 
cabinets, bookcases, TV/computer monitors, and electrical boxes that are potential sources of 
interior debris in a blast event.  As shown in Figure 2a, occupants in single BRMs are inevitably 
located near exterior walls, which increases the vulnerability from non-structural debris compared 
to personnel located at the interior of a larger building. Electrical boxes (Figure 2b) are most 
typically anchored to the interior surface of exterior walls, and it is common for operator control 
panels (Figure 2c) to also be located at exterior walls to optimize the use of interior space.    
 
   
(a) Single module layout (b) Wall-mounted electrical boxes (c) Control monitors 
Figure 2.  Example Wall-Mounted or Near-Wall Potential Debris Sources 
 
Cabinets, bookcases and other items with an elevated center of gravity are generally placed directly 
adjacent to an exterior wall surface.  These types of items are typically observed to topple over 
when placed near a blast-loaded exterior wall, as illustrated in Figure 3.  Electrical boxes, picture 
frames, and wall mounted TVs and cabinets have been observed to fail and be thrown inward due 
to poor overall anchorage capacity to the structure, or failure of the element itself.  In the first 
instance, the anchorage typically pulls out of the supporting wall component and creates a debris 
hazard.  If the anchorage is sufficiently strong preventing this from occurring, failure can still occur 
in the non-structural component itself.  This is observed in Figure 3, where the face of an electrical 




Figure 3.  Wall mounted Non-Structural Building Debris  
 
3 Industry State-of-the-Practice  
 
Typical BRM exterior dimensions are between 10 and 14 ft wide, up to 50 ft long, and between 8 
and 12 ft tall.  Single module units became popular replacements to wood trailers after the 
catastrophic 2005 Texas City refinery explosion and have become more prevalent as permanent 
structures in the past decade.  Where larger footprints are desired, individual BRMs are field 
connected to one another.  These multi-module BRMs are often classified as permanent structures 
but can also be temporary structures used for turnaround.  BRMs can therefore be classified as 
either temporary or permanent structures.  Figure 4 provides exemplar photographs of single and 
multi-module BRMs located near process units. 
 
 
   
Figure 4.  Single-module BRM (Left) and Multi-module BRM (Right) 
 
While OSHA standard 29 CFR Part 1910 states that a FSS must be performed to assess potential 
hazards to occupants, it does not state the specific procedures for the assessment, or impose 
mandatory building design requirements.  The principal documents for performing a FSS on 
permanent and temporary (portable) buildings are, respectively, API RP 752 Management of 
Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Buildings [1,2,3] and API RP 753 
Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Portable Buildings [4].  These 
recommended practice (RP) documents are non-mandatory guidelines but are considered as the 
industry standard for FSS.  While intended for different building types, the RPs universally state 
that a detailed structural analysis is required for new buildings designed to resist blast loads and 
that non-structural debris should be evaluated.  The state-of-practice for structural and non-
structural design and evaluation is discussed in the following subsections.  
 
3.1  Structural Design Philosophy  
It is important for the reader to understand the basic methodologies used for blast analysis of 
building structures.  The structural elements such as columns, beams and wall panels that make up 
a BRM are typically analysed as individual components.  Each component is analysed as an 
equivalent single-degree-of-freedom (SDOF) system, using the mid-span displacement as the 
 
point of interest.  As shown in Figure 5, a SDOF component is loaded with a transient blast load, 
and the mid-span displacement is tracked.  The magnitude of peak deflection is of primary interest, 
and this value is used to approximate the level of damage each component will undergo.  Unless 
designed to remain elastic, which is rarely the case for any structural component, there will be a 
permanent deflection which may limit the reusability of a structure.  Figure 6 further illustrates 






Applied blast load history, p(t) 
 
Mid-span displacement history, x(t)  
Figure 5.  Example SDOF Blast Analysis Methodology 
 
API 752 and API 753 both recommend the use of the ASCE Petrochemical Guideline for the design 
and assessment of blast-loaded buildings.  API 752 [3] also cites the PIP STC01018 manual and 
the USACE PDC Technical Report 06-08 [9], but neither of these documents specifically address 
the design of BRMs.  The ASCE guideline provides deflection limits for the design of wall and 
roof components, such as the corrugated plate walls, columns and beams.  These are known as 
response limits, which are intended to correlate the maximum predicted displacement to qualitative 













































































Figure 6.  Example Permanent Deflection of a Tested BRM Wall Panel  
 
There are three damage thresholds specified in the ASCE Petrochemical Guideline [5,6]; Low, 
Medium, and High.  The qualitative damage descriptions for each of these states are listed in Table 
1.  Note that the damage descriptions are only indicative of structural damage and do not consider 
non-structural debris.  Qualitative descriptions are correlated to quantitative response limits, which 
dictate allowable structural component deflections caused by blast loading.  Quantitative limits 
have historically been developed using scaled- and full-scale high-explosive (HE) and shock tube 
test data and accident investigation observations.   
 
Limited test and accident data are available for the crimped wall panels used on BRMs, and 
consequently there is not a prescribed response criterion for this type of structural component. The 
ASCE Petrochemical Guideline recommends that this type of crimped wall panel is designed for 
a response between a light-gauge corrugated panels (typical on metal warehouse-type buildings) 
and flat steel plate.   Table 2 lists the quantitative limits for these component types.  The table also 
includes the ductility factor, µ, which is the ratio of maximum displacement to yield displacement.  
Hence a value exceeding unity implies the component has yielded and there will be permanent 
deflection.  The qualitative and quantitative limits in the PIP STC01018 [7,8] manual are replicates 
of the ASCE Petrochemical Guideline.   
 
Based on the ASCE Guideline [6], it is customary practice for an average of the two limits to be 
used for the design of crimped plates for BRMs.   Light-gauge panels have a propensity to buckle, 
which is why their limits are much less than that of flat steel plates.  If buckling is explicitly 
accounted for in the analysis, the response limits of flat steel plates can be adopted, allowing larger 
displacements in the wall and/or roof panels.  Note that the original ASCE Guideline [5] had no 
considerations for the design of BRMs, and guidance was first provided in the 2010 2nd Edition. 
 
As previously mentioned, the overall dimensions of a BRM can vary significantly.  The roof eave 
height is typically the most consistent across modules, ranging between 8 ft and 12 ft.  Table 3 is 
provided as an example of the magnitude of allowable structural component deflections in a typical 
 
BRM design.  Most BRM structural components are designed to sustain Medium damage, which 
corresponds to an allowable peak mid-span deflection of 5 inches for a 12 ft span.  Because typical 
BRM crimped wall panels are stiff, the permanent displacement would be expected to at least 80% 
of the peak deflection.   
 




Low Component has none to slight visible permanent damage. 
Medium 
Component has some permanent deflection. It is generally repairable, if 
necessary, although replacement may be more economical and aesthetic. 
High 
Component has not failed, but it has significant permanent deflections 
causing it to be unrepairable. 
 
Table 2.  Quantitative Criteria for Steel Panels and Plates [6] 
Element Type 
Low Medium High 
µa θa µa θa µa θa 
Secured cold-formed panels 1.75 1.25° 3 2° 6 4° 
Flat steel plates 5 3° 10 6° 20 12° 
Average (used for BRM 
crimped panels)  
3.4 2.1° 6.5 4° 13 8° 
 




Maximum Mid-span Deflection 
Span = 8 ft Span = 10 ft  Span = 12 ft Span = 14 ft 
Low 2° 1.7″ 2.1″ 2.5″ 2.9″ 
Medium 4° 3.4″ 4.2″ 5.0″ 5.9″ 
High 8° 6.7″ 8.4″ 10.1″ 11.8″ 
 
 
3.2 Non-structural Design Guidance  
The recommendations and methodologies in the blast guidelines and recommended practices are 
discussed herein. Non-structural design guidance is most commonly qualitative, and limited 
quantitative measures are provided.   Table 4 provides a summary of these for the most common 
U.S. guidelines used for blast assessment of buildings in refineries and processing facilities. 
  
 
Table 4.  Non-Structural Debris Design Recommendations from Different Blast Documents 
Title Guidance  Recommendation 
API RP 752 
(3rd Ed.) 
Qualitative 
Assessment must address non-structural components (roofs, walls, ceilings and 




Design should limit dislodgement of internal features.  Secure internal furniture, 





Permanent fixtures and equipment should be designed to withstand local building 
motions.  Seismic anchorage techniques are valid for blast.  Functional or 
decorative objects should not be mounted on the interior surface of an exterior 
wall.    
Quantitative 
Place file cabinets and other furnishings off the interior surface of an exterior wall 





Suspended items: Anchorage for a statically applied force equal to the mass of 
the item times the maximum acceleration of the roof, or five times the weight of 
the item, whichever is less.  Items weighing more than 10 pounds should be 
independently anchored.  
Equipment and Internally Mounted Items:  Instrumentation or electrical 
equipment shall not be mounted on the interior face of walls subjected to blast 
loads without owner’s approval.   
All fixed floor-supported items (e.g. lockers, electrical cabinets, racks) shall have 
a minimum clearance from exterior walls equal to the maximum calculated lateral 
blast load deflection.   
The maximum deflection shall be the sum of both the overall building sidesway 
and the deflection of and wall component(s), calculated based on the maximum 
blast loads.  
Supports and anchorage for equipment shall be designed to resist a lateral force 
equal to 20% of the equipment weight.  
 
The API 752 and API 753 RPs recognize the need to assess non-structural debris hazards in 
different qualitative ways, depending on the edition.  Appendix D in the 1st and 2nd editions of API 
752 include an example building checklist for assessing risk-reduction measures in occupied 
buildings.  The questions include looking at whether large office equipment, stacks of materials, 
lighting fixtures, ceilings, or wall-mounted equipment are “well-supported” or “adequately 
secured”.  Quantitative recommendations for determining what type of connection is adequate are 
not provided in the document.  This checklist was removed from the 3rd Edition of API 752 and 
readers were instead made aware of non-structural debris as a cause of occupant vulnerability with 
the following statement:  
 
“The primary hazards to personnel located indoors are building collapse and debris. 
Debris may include building materials thrown from exterior walls or dropped from 
ceilings/roof. Building contents located on, against, or near external walls may also 
become debris.”  
 
API 752 (3rd Edition) states that the evaluation of existing buildings (Section 6.6) and new 
buildings (Section 6.8) address non-structural components that may present debris hazards from 
roofs, walls, ceilings and mechanical services.  However, like the 1st and 2nd editions of API 752, 
there is no recommendation on how to perform this assessment, or correctly design the anchorage.   
API 753 also acknowledges non-structural debris in portable buildings can cause injuries to 
occupants and requires blast assessments address internal non-structural features.  Further 
 
recommended risk reduction practices include securing internal furniture, office equipment, and 
fixtures, but without specific examples or guidance on how to do so.   
 
Non-structural debris is discussed in the ASCE Petrochemical and PIP STC01018 guidelines that 
are referenced by API 752.  ASCE Petrochemical states that “permanent fixtures and equipment 
should be designed to withstand the calculated local building motions as a results of blast loads.”  
This guideline stops short of providing quantitative guidelines for designing restraints and direct 
the user to seismic guidelines that provide anchorage methods for non-structural items in 
earthquake prone buildings.  As stated in ASCE, “all non-structural upgrades recommended for 
buildings subject to earthquake loads are also applicable for blast resistant design.”    
 
The ASCE manual covers architectural items in more detail, albeit somewhat contradictory to the 
aforementioned statements.  Architectural items fall under the discipline of the architect, who is 
not often knowledgeable of expected building damage.  Quantitative guidance is given that file 
cabinets and furnishings should be placed off the interior surface of the wall at least the distance 
of the maximum predicted wall displacement.  ASCE also states that functional or decorative 
architectural objects should not be placed on the interior surface of an exterior wall.   
 
PIP STC01018 provides the most quantitative guidance minimum structural and non-structural 
design criteria requirements for permanent blast resistant buildings.  Any item weighing more than 
10 pounds (5 kg) and suspended from the roof, should be anchored to structural framing members.  
The anchorage should be designed to resist a static force that is the lesser of 5 times the weight of 
the object, or the mass of the object multiplied by the peak predicted acceleration.  Hence if a roof 
member has a blast acceleration that exceeds 5g (g = acceleration of gravity), then the anchorage 
would only be designed for 5 times the weight of the object.  Other clauses are similar to ASCE, 
where interior items should not be wall mounted, and fixed-floor items should be spaced a distance 
equal to the total wall deflection.  
 
4  Reasons for Non-structural Debris  
Non-structural debris generated during an explosion are primarily caused by wall or roof 
displacement.  BRMs differ from permanent buildings, as they are not always integral with a 
foundation, and they can slide during a blast event.  Both of these phenomena cause large 
decelerations to occur to objects within a BRM.  This is analogous to rapid deceleration in an 
automobile, where occupants are thrust forward in their seat as a car is traveling forward and brakes 
suddenly.  Accelerations can be significant from both local (wall or roof) and global (sliding) 
movement during a blast event in BRMs, and both of these are discussed in more detail herein.   
 
4.1  Wall or Roof Deflection  
As previously discussed, wall and roof members of BRMs are allowed to undergo large 
displacements.  Guidance for placing items off the walls is not always followed, particularly in 
single module BRMs to maximize the useable floor area.  As previously shown in Table 3, an 
interior partition wall would need to be spaced between 4 to 6 inches off the interior surface of the 
exterior wall to not be directly impacted by the wall.  This is not possible with interior ceiling 
items, which by necessity must be connected to a structural member to be suspended.  Hence this 
 
section focuses on items rigidly attached to a wall or roof surface to demonstrate connection the 
magnitude of connection forces.  
 
As plotted in Figure 7a, peak displacements, and therefore velocities and accelerations, will occur 
at the mid-span of a member responding in flexure.  When a member reaches peak displacement, 
indicated with the dotted-line and diamond marker in Figure 7b, the velocity of the wall is nil 
(Figure 7c), and the wall deceleration is maximum (Figure 7d).   
 
In the case of non-structural wall or roof debris rigidly attached to the structural wall, the peak 
deceleration coincides with the maximum force that will be experienced in the connection of the 
non-structural item to the structural member.  The connection force, F, is equal to the product of 
the maximum deceleration, A, of the structural member and the mass, M, of the non-structural 
item.  Hence for the example in Figure 7, the peak deceleration of the structural member is around 





The mid-span is where the maximum 
displacement, velocity, and acceleration, A, occur.  
With an attached non-structural item with mass, M, 
the force, F, applied to the connection of the non-
structural item to the structural member is F = MA 
 
(a) Deflected shape at arbitrary time (b) Mid-span displacement 
  
(c) Mid-span velocity (d) Mid-span acceleration 
Figure 7.  Example SDOF Analysis to Predict Connection Forces and Debris Velocities 
 
 
It is evident that for this arbitrary wall panel, the guidance by PIP STC01018 (5 times the member 
weight) would significantly under-predict the required anchorage force.  Figure 7 plots a dash-
dotted line with a circular marker to represent this case.  It can be observed that the non-structural 








































































structural item would therefore detach and be launched with an initial velocity (Figure 7c) near the 
peak wall velocity.  This phenomenon is what causes wall or roof mounted debris to be launched 
into occupied areas of BRMs.  
 
Individual 3-inch deep crimped walls, one with 3/16-inch thick plate spanning 8 ft, and the other 
with ¼-inch thick plate spanning 9.5 ft are selected for demonstration purposes.   The profiles 
selected are representative of BRM construction and satisfy an ASCE Medium response for an 8 
psig free-field overpressure.  SDOF analyses were completed from which the peak decelerations 
and velocities were computed to examine the predicted differences in rigid non-structural element 
connections.   
 
Figure 8a and Figure 8b plots the peak decelerations for the 3/16-inch thick and ¼-inch thick plate, 
respectively.  These graphs demonstrate that the wall accelerations are independent of the wall 
deflection, provided the wall deflection exceeds the yield point, which is usually on the order of 
½-inch.  Hence a BRM will still experience the same deceleration at a wall displacement that is 
less than the allowable displacement.  Comparison of these two graphs also demonstrates the 
concept that heavier wall panels will have lower decelerations than lighter panels.  Figure 8c 




(a) Decelerations for 3/16-inch thick crimped wall plate (b) Decelerations for 1/4-inch thick crimped wall plate 
  
(c) Deceleration for different wall panels (d) Peak velocities for different wall panels 



























































































































































Figure 8d plots the peak velocity of the different wall panels with respect to free-field overpressure.  
Also included in this plot is the 10 ft/sec threshold specified by UFC 3-340-02 [10] as a critical 
velocity for serious injury to personnel due to fragment impact.  Serious injury is expected if a 
fragment is traveling faster than 10 ft/sec and exceeds 2.5 lbs (impacting the thorax), 6 lbs 
(impacting the abdomen), or 8 lbs (hitting the head).  For the representative BRM wall panels 
analyzed, this threshold would be exceeded at approximately 4 psig, or half the design-basis blast 
load of 8 psig.   
 
4.2  Sliding Acceleration  
BRMs that are not anchored to a foundation, or only anchored for conventional wind loads, are 
susceptible to sliding during a blast event, as illustrated in Figure 9a.  This causes global 
accelerations to be imparted to non-structural items, even if they are anchored off a wall surface.  
The magnitude of the horizontal accelerations incurred depends on the BRM weight, dimensions, 
blast load and coefficient of friction between the BRM and foundation (or soil) beneath it.   
 
An example case is created for a 12 ft tall, 12 ft wide BRM with an assumed coefficient of friction 
of 0.3, representative of steel on concrete.  Representative weights per floor area, 100 psf and 150 
psf, were selected.  Figure 9b plots peak horizontal accelerations as a function of free-field 
overpressure.  While increased weight reduces the horizontal acceleration, pressures less than a 
typical 8 psig design pressure exceed the PIP STC01018 recommended design acceleration of 0.2g 
for equipment.  Hence debris can credibly be produced even if interior items are spaced off the 






(a) Schematic of rigid body sliding (b) Global acceleration using friction coefficient of 0.3  
Figure 9.  Sliding Acceleration in BRMs 
 
5  Conclusions and Recommendations  
Non-structural debris is recognized as a credible hazard in blast documents that are used to site 
and design temporary and permanent buildings at chemical processing and refining facilities.  This 
paper summarized the limited quantitative guidance available intended to mitigate against these 
hazards.  Simplified modeling of crimped wall panels representative of BRMs demonstrated that 
anchorage forces for wall-mounted non-structural items are significant and may be impractical to 
develop in some structural substrates.  This conclusion also applies to architectural and mechanical 





























PIP STC01018 EQUIPMENT (0.2g)
 
 
While some guidance documents instruct designers to place non-structural items off the interior 
face of exterior walls, this is not possible to do with ceiling items which must be attached to the 
superstructure to remain suspended.  Even if this guidance is followed for walls, global sliding 
accelerations are applied to all interior non-structural items in unanchored BRMs.  This paper 
demonstrated that these sliding accelerations can be significantly higher than the recommended 
design forces in blast guidelines, therefore increasing the likelihood of debris generation.  BRMs 
should be designed with these factors as a consideration.  Design forces should be based on detailed 
computational models, where the non-structural elements are accounted for in the model.  
Alternatively, representative wall or roof assemblies can be blast tested to determine if non-
structural connections are sufficiently strong to prevent non-structural items from becoming debris 
hazards.    
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